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Financial reporting quality: is fair value 
a plus or a minus? 
Stephen H. Penman* 
Recent deliberations by both the International With the passage of time, historical prices be- 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the come irrelevant in assessing an entity’s current 
Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) in financial position. Prices provide up-to-date in- 
the United States have focused on how fair values formation about the value of assets. 
of assets and liabilities should be measured. The 
issue of when, rather than how, fair value measure- 
ment should be applied is still far from resolved, 
however. Fair values have been mandated for 
some assets and liabilities under both IASB and 
FASB standards, but it is fair to say that principles 
governing the applicability of fair values have yet 
to be articulated: when is fair value accounting ap- 
propriate and when is it not? Or, in terms of my 
charge for this paper, under what circumstances is 
fair value a plus or a minus? 
To prepare for my task, I made a survey of pub- 
lic statements made for and against fair value ac- 
counting by a variety of standard setters, 
regulators, analysts, and preparers. The stated ‘mi- 
nuses’ typically point to the dangers of fair value 
estimates from marking to model rather than mark- 
ing to market, concerns about introducing ‘excess 
volatility’ into earnings, and feedback effects (on 
banks’ lending practices, for example) that could 
damage a business and, indeed, heighten systemat- 
ic risk. A few antagonists question whether fair 
values (for bank assets and liabilities, for example) 
really capture the economics of a business (in fos- 
tering core deposits and making loans). In counter- 
point, the proponents of fair value argue that fair 
value is a superior economic measure to historical 
cost. Consider the following arguments, often ad- 
vanced as ‘pluses’: 
Investors are concerned with value, not costs, so 
report fair values. 
*The author is at the Graduate School of Business, 
Columbia University, shp38@columbia.edu This paper draws 
on some of the themes in a White Paper prepared for the 
Center for Excellence in Accounting and Security Analysis 
(CEASA) at Columbia Business School. See D. Nissim and S .  
Penman, The Boundaries of Fair Value Accounting, White 
Paper No. 2 (Center for Excellence in Accounting and 
Security Analysis, Columbia University, 2007). Comments re- 
ceived at the Information f o r  Better Markets Conference have 
been helpful as has a close reading of the manuscript by 
Martin Walker and Pauline Weetman. 
Fair value accounting reports assets and liabili- 
ties in the way that an economist would look at 
them; fair values reflect true economic sub- 
stance. 
Fair value accounting reports economic income: 
in accordance with the widely accepted Hicksian 
definition of income as a change in wealth, the 
change in fair value of net assets on the balance 
sheet yields income. Fair value accounting is a 
solution to the accountant’s problem of income 
measurement, and is to be preferred to the hun- 
dreds of rules underlying historical cost income. 
Fair value is a market-based measure that is not 
affected by factors specific to a particular entity; 
accordingly it represents an unbiased measure- 
ment that is consistent from period to period and 
across entities. 
So self-evident do these points seem to be that 
fair value accounting is often just presumed to be 
‘more relevant’. The words, ‘fair value’ sound 
good (who could be against ice-cream and fair 
value?!) while ‘historical cost’ sounds, well, passC. 
As it turns, out, however, each of these statements 
becomes qualified under scrutiny. Can economic 
argument lead to constructive arguments for im- 
plementing fair value accounting? 
1. Some preliminaries 
Pluses and minuses can only be evaluated against 
an alternative, so I will take the approach of asking 
if (or under what conditions) fair value accounting 
is an improvement over historical cost accounting. 
In discussions about fair value, people often pro- 
ceed at cross-purposes, so a few points need to be 
clear before we proceed. 
I .I. What is fair value? 
Three notions of fair value accounting enter the 
discussion, and one must be clear which is being 
entertained. 
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ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
tions (1) and (2) can be debated, but note that both 
are really modified cost accounting; both maintain 
standard revenue recognition - applying exit 
prices to recognise value from business activity 
only on actual exit of the product or service to the 
market - but with modifications to the expense 
matching.’ Application 3 applies exit values to 
continually remark assets and liabilities but with- 
out actual exit (realisation). 
The FASB, in its recent Statement 157, Fair 
Value Measurements endorses fair value as exit 
value, with a seeming nod from the IASB subject 
to some minor reservations:* 
‘Fair value is the price that would be received to 
sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an 
orderly transaction between market participants 
at the measurement date.’ 
While the IASB and FASB presumably envision 
exit values being applied to determine fair value in 
the mixed attribute model ( l) ,  I will limit my com- 
ments to fair value applied in (3): It is the recog- 
nition of exit values without an historical exit 
transaction that places this fair value accounting in 
such contrast to historical cost accounting. The 
top-line notion of revenue disappears, and income 
is simply the change in fair values on the balance 
sheet. Accordingly, the accounting issues are quite 
different. Continually remarking equity invest- 
ments to fair value rather than using the equity 
method involves different issues from impairing 
equity method investments for a permanent loss 
under mixed attribute accounting. And so with 
marking inventories, core deposits, bank loans, in- 
surance contracts, debt, and so on to fair value on 
a continual basis. ‘Fair value accounting’ as envi- 
sioned in application (3) is a potential shift in par- 
adigm! 
1.2. Fair value to whom? 
As with any policy issue, prescriptions cannot be 
made without an understanding of the objectives 
of the exercise. To whom are we reporting? Whose 
pluses and whose minuses? Different users may 
demand different accounting reports, and confu- 
sion reigns if issues are discussed at cross purpos- 
es. A shareholder might recognise a gain from a 
fall in the market value of debt as creditworthiness 
deteriorates, but not the creditor. Bank sharehold- 
ers might wish to see bank deposits at fair value, 
but not the depositors. A bank regulator would also 
be concerned about reporting deposits at less than 
face value if such reporting affected depositors’ 
confidence in the banking system. While an in- 
vestor might welcome the information about 
volatility that fair value accounting reveals, not so 
a central banker who might be concerned about 
feedback effects on systematic risk. A bank regula- 
tor might be concerned about marking up banks’ 
34 
1. 
2 .  
3. 
Fair value variously applied in a ‘mixed attrib- 
ute model’: 
In this treatment, fair value is used alternative- 
ly with historical cost for the same asset or lia- 
bility but at different times; the accounting is 
primarily historical cost accounting, but fair 
values are applied under certain conditions. 
Examples are fair values applied in fresh-start 
accounting (that then proceeds under historical 
cost accounting), impairment from historical 
cost to fair value (really a form of fresh-start 
accounting), using fair values to establish his- 
torical cost (for barter transactions and dona- 
tions, for example) or in the allocation of 
purchase price (between goodwill and tangible 
assets, for example), and reference to fair value 
to discipline estimates under historical cost ac- 
counting. 
Fair value continually applied as entry value: 
Assets are revalued at their replacement cost, 
with current costs then recorded in the income 
statement, with unrealised (holding) gains and 
losses also recognised. Revenue recognition 
and matching is maintained but income, based 
on current costs, is said to be a better indicator 
of the future and not path-dependent. 
Fair value continually applied as exit value: 
Assets and liabilities are remarked each period 
to current exit price, with unrealised gains and 
losses from the remarking recorded as part of 
(comprehensive) income. 
The pluses and minuses of fair value in applica- 
’ For example, impairment to fair value under application 
( I )  fresh-starts the matching of expenses to future revenues 
when there is a downward revision in future revenues antici- 
pated, that is, cost have expired. Application (2) matches cur- 
rent costs rather than historical costs to (current) revenues. 
FASB Statement 33 (now suspended) was an experiment with 
application (2). but those issues are not part of the current de- 
bate. See Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 
33, Financial Reporting and Changing P r ims (Norwalk, 
Conn.: FASB, September 1979). 
See Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157, 
Fair Value Measurements (Norwalk, Conn.: FASB, September 
2006), paras 5-15 and Discussion paper, Fair Value 
Measurements Part 1: Invitation to Comment (London: IASB, 
November 2006). 
Statement 157 is explicit in stating that the standard deals 
with the measurement of fair value (when fair value measure- 
ments are applicable), not with the issue of when fair value 
measurements are applicable. IASB discussion documents 
have the same flavour. However, the application question is 
very much open and (presumably) part of the conceptual 
framework agenda. 
Under application (3),  some assets or liabilities might be 
carried at fair value (continually) while others are carried at 
historical cost (continually). So, marketable securities might 
be marked to market, with inventories at historical cost. This 
form of a ‘mixed attribute model’ differs from moving be- 
tween fair value and historical cost for the same asset and lia- 
bility. 
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Special Issue: International Accounting Policy Forum. 2007 
capital during speculative times with the resulting 
incentive for profligate lending? 
In this talk, I take a shareholder perspective: 
what are the pluses and minuses of using fair value 
accounting (rather than historical cost accounting) 
for reporting to shareholders? This, I submit, is 
hardly controversial; the shareholders are the own- 
ers to whom management and auditors report. But 
it does mean that, if standard setters have a broad- 
er set of constituents in mind, with an objective of 
general purpose financial reporting, then they may 
see the issues differently. 
1.3. M y  approach 
Normative statements about accounting issues 
are often statements of the author’s received wis- 
dom combined with some a priori thinking: here is 
what I think about the matter, says the author, sup- 
ported by some inductive and deductive logic. This 
approach, applied in the ‘accounting theory’ era of 
the 1950s to the 1970s, gave us numerous prescrip- 
tions but little resolution. It would be helpful to 
refer to concrete research results for answers, but 
theoretical and empirical research has not delivered 
a definite resolution either. Recent accounting- 
based valuation theory has given us some insight to 
which I will refer later. Empirical research (of the 
type discussed by Wayne Landsman) documents 
correlations between fair value measurements and 
stock prices that are useful for understanding 
whether fair values are ‘relevant to investors’. But 
it does not give us much of a handle on the policy 
question of whether fair values should be reported 
in place of historical cost accounting (which, re- 
search shows, is also relevant to investors).“ 
My approach, I must confess, is largely a priori. 
But I hope to get some bite by taking what might 
be referred to as a demand approach. Accounting, 
as I see it, is a product and products are a matter of 
design. The design - and the quality of the product 
- should be judged on how well it serves the cus- 
tomer. So, with the customer identified as the 
shareholder (above), I ask which product features 
- fair value or historical cost - help (or frustrate) 
the customer. Unfortunately, inferring demand 
from statements made in the current regulatory en- 
vironment is difficult, given that regulation affects 
behaviour. We do observe the voluntary applica- 
tion of fair value accounting (without the coercion 
of regulation) in some situations - unregulated 
hedge funds use fair value accounting, for example 
- and so we can defer to ‘the market’ for lessons. 
Such observations are limited, however, so I resort 
to a priori analysis. But I do so with an eye to the 
shareholder; I presume that shareholders require 
accounting information for two purposes: 
1.  Valuation. Shareholders use accounting infor- 
mation to inform them about the (fair) value of 
the equity: What is the equity worth? 
2. 
35 
Stewardship. Shareholders use accounting in- 
formation to assess the stewardship of manage- 
ment, the owners’ employees: How efficient 
have managers been in making investments 
and conducting operations to add value for 
shareholders? 
More concretely, I force an orientation to practi- 
cal tasks for which information is demanded: To 
what extent does fair value accounting aid or frus- 
trate the tasks of equity valuation and monitoring 
managers’ stewardship? This focus, also, is hardly 
controversial. The first task is that of the equity an- 
alyst, the second the pursuit of those involved in 
corporate governance on behalf of shareholders. 
In view of the above, many of the points I make 
below are not particularly original. I want to be a 
little more analytical than simply listing the stan- 
dard litany of complaints about and statements in 
favour of fair value accounting. But, in doing so, 
some well-worn points come to the surface. By 
presenting them in a more organised framework, 
my hope is that they will be more imperative. 
1.4. Information for better markets 
It is often said that financial reporting should have 
the objective of providing all relevant information 
to capital markets. So (it follows), if both historical 
cost information and fair values are relevant, both 
should be reported. Nothing here subtracts from that 
position (if one wants to adopt it). The issue is 
which measurement basis should go through the 
discipline of the accounting system to determine the 
summary, bottom-line numbers, earnings and book 
value on which investors and analysts focus (for 
whatever bounded rationality reason). Alternatives 
to the accounting information (within the system) 
can, of course, be supplied in footnotes, much like 
some fair value information is now disclosed. 
2. The conceptual merits of fair 
value accounting versus historical 
cost accounting 
As with most accounting issues, it is important to 
distinguish conceptual issues from those that have 
~~ 
Papers that deal with fair value from the view of the cen- 
tral banker and bank regulator include A. Enria et al., Fair 
Value and Financial Stability Occasional Paper Series No. 13, 
European Central Bank,April 2004; G .  Plantin, H. Sapra, and 
H .  Shin, ‘Marking to market, liquidity, and financial stability’, 
Monetary and Economic Studies (Special Edition), October 
2005; K .  Burkhardt and R. Strausz, ‘The effect of fair vs. book 
value accounting on banks’, unpublished paper, Free 
University of Berlin, April 2004; and ‘Fair value accounting 
for financial instruments: some implications for bank regula- 
tion’, BIS Working paper No.209, August 2006. 
Indeed, inferences from the empirical research are limited 
because stock prices, from which ‘relevance’ is inferred, are de- 
termined from information under current accounting practices, 
and those prices might be different under alternative practices. 
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to do with measurement. Here I ‘conceptualise’ 
how both fair value accounting and historical cost 
accounting would satisfy the valuation and stew- 
ardship goals of shareholder reporting, in principle 
(if measurement were no problem). I then overlay 
the concepts with measurement in Section 3. 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
The accounting for investment funds - mutual 
funds and hedge funds - applies this strict fair 
value accounting, and investors are willing to trade 
in and out of these funds at book value (‘net asset 
value’) with the presumption that book value 
equals value (with no gains and losses between 
shareholders). Further, the income (returns) for 
these funds is accepted as a comprehensive meas- 
ure of the fund managers’ investment perform- 
ance, both the investment success and the 
volatility to which investors have been subjected. 
The accounting is sufficient; one does not require 
a balanced scorecard. 
2.1. The concepts behind fair value accounting 
Putting aside measurement issues, fair value ac- 
counting conveys information about equity value 
and managements’ stewardship by stating all as- 
sets and liabilities on the balance sheet as their 
value to shareholders:’ 
the balance sheet becomes the primary vehicle 
for conveying information to shareholders; 
with all assets and liabilities recorded on the 
balance sheet at fair value, the book value of eq- 
uity reports the value of equity (the Price/Book 
ratio = 1.0); 
the income (profit and loss) statement reports 
‘economic income’ because it is simply the 
change in value over a period; 
following the economic principle that current 
changes in value do not predict future changes in 
value, earnings cannot forecast future earnings. 
But this is of no concern for valuation, because 
the balance sheet provides the valuation; 
(unexpected) earnings, being a shock to value, 
reports on the risk of the equity investment. 
Volatility in earnings is informative for value at 
risk; 
the P/E ratio is Price/Shock-to-value, that is, a 
realisation of value at risk (with a very different 
interpretation to that under historical cost); 
income reports the stewardship of management 
in adding value for shareholders. 
In short, the balance sheet satisfies the valuation 
objective and the income statement provides infor- 
mation about risk exposure and management per- 
formance. 
’ This idea is close to that of ‘value in use’ but with a focus 
on the shareholder rather than on the entity. The value-in-use 
concept (or its variant, ‘deprival value’) appears (for example) 
in Accounting Standards Board, Sfufement of Principles for 
Financial Reporting (London: ASB, 1999), Australian 
Accounting Research Foundation, Accounting Theory 
Monograph No. 10, Measurement in Financial Accounting 
(AARF, 1998) and has long been part of the discussion, for ex- 
ample in J. Horton and R. Macve, ‘ ‘Fair value’ for financial 
instruments: how erasing theory is leading to unworkable 
global accounting standards for performance reporting’, 
Australian Accounting Review 10 (July 2000): 26-39 and R. 
Macve and G. Serafeim, “‘Deprival value” vs “fair value” 
measurement for contract liabilities in resolving the “revenue 
recognition” conundrum: towards a general solution’, 
Unpublished paper, London School of Economics, June 2006. 
2.2. The concepts behind historical cost 
accounting 
Historical cost accounting is often misinterpret- 
ed in the debate, with the criticism that it reports a 
balance sheet with old, historical costs rather than 
current values. This statement is correct, but belies 
an understanding about how historical cost works 
for valuation and performance assessment. Under 
historical cost accounting, 
9 the income statement is the primary vehicle for 
conveying information about value to sharehold- 
ers, not the balance sheet; 
earnings report how well the firm has performed 
in arbitraging prices in input (supplier) markets 
and output (customer) markets; that is, historical 
cost earnings reports the value-added buying in- 
puts at one price, transforming them according 
to a business model, and selling them at another 
price; 
in contrast to fair value accounting, current in- 
come forecasts future income on which a valua- 
tion can be made; 
the P/B ratio is typically not equal to 1 .O and the 
P/E ratio takes current earnings as a base and 
multiplies it according to the forecast of future 
earnings ; 
earnings do not report shocks to value, but 
shocks to trading in input and output markets: 
earnings measure the stewardship of manage- 
ment in arbitraging input and output markets, 
that is, in adding value in markets. 
Historical cost accounting views value as gener- 
ated in business by purchasing inputs (from suppli- 
ers), transforming them according to a business 
plan, and selling the consequent product (to cus- 
tomers) over cost; in short, value is added by arbi- 
traging (entry and exit) prices in input and output 
markets for goods and services according to a 
business plan. Historical cost accounting does not 
report the (present) value of expected outcomes 
from the business plan. Rather, it reports on 
progress that has been made in executing the plan, 
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recognising value added (earnings) from actual 
transactions in the input and output markets being 
arbitraged. The income statement comes to the 
fore with a matching of revenues (value received 
from transactional exit prices) with costs (value 
surrendered in transactional input prices). The bal- 
ance sheet is not a statement of values (for the 
large part), by design, but rather a by-product of 
this matching, with liabilities such as accrued ex- 
penses, deferred revenues, and deferred taxes gain- 
ing their legitimacy from the matching process 
rather than as representations of the value of obli- 
gations. 
The term, ‘historical cost’ is unfortunately pejo- 
rative. A better term, one that captures the essence, 
is ‘historical transactions accounting’, for the ac- 
counting reports a history of transactions, and it is 
that history of engaging with markets from which 
valuations are made and management performance 
assessed. 
31 
Expected Earnings,,, = Earnings, (C) 
That is, current earnings (ideally measured) are 
sufficient for forecasting earnings and for valua- 
tion. In the parlance, current earnings indicate per- 
manent earnings .* Accordingly, under historical 
cost accounting equity value is determined by cap- 
italising current earnings: 
Value, = Earnings, (D) 
3.3. The demand for fa ir  values 
A demand for fair values could be imputed if 
historical cost information is shown to be deficient 
for valuation and performance evaluation, with 
fair values providing the remedy. Here I compare 
the two for purposes of valuation. 
To separate concepts from measurement issues, 
it is helpful to compare fair value accounting and 
historical cost accounting implemented in their 
ideal form. Ideal fair value accounting reports a 
book value that is sufficient to value a firm but 
earnings that are useless for the purpose. Ideal his- 
torical cost accounting produces a balance sheet 
that does not report value, but earnings that are 
sufficient to value a firm. Consider the following 
equity valuation model based on expected earn- 
ings (that is a legitimate one in valuation theory in 
the sense that it gives the same value as that based 
on expected dividends): 
Value, = Expected Earnings,,, (A) 
r 
Here r is the required return for the equity holders. 
forecasted from the current book value: 
Under ideal fair value accounting, earnings are 
Expected Earnings,,, = r x Book Value, (B) 
That is, book value (ideally measured at fair 
value) is sufficient for forecasting earnings and for 
valuation. Under ideal historical cost accounting 
earnings are forecasted from current earnings: 
One must accommodate retention that yields additional 
earnings; the forecast here is for the case of full payout. 
Valuation under ideal fair value accounting and ideal histori- 
cal cost accounting is modelled in J .  Ohlson and X. Zhang, 
‘Accrual accounting and equity valuation,’ Journal of 
Accounting Research, 36 (Supplement 1998): 85-1 11 .  
r 
The lessons are: 
It is not necessary to state the balance sheet at 
fair value to satisfy the valuation objective. 
Valuations can be made from the historical cost 
income statement. 
Assuming that one knows the required equity 
return, there is no reason, in principle, to say 
that fair value accounting is better than histori- 
cal cost accounting. The resolution must turn 
on how measurement strays from the ideal. 
Historical cost comes with considerable meas- 
urement issues; does fair value measurement 
provide a solution? 
If one does not know the required return (and 
we don’t!), fair value accounting has a distinct 
advantage. Valuation under historical cost ac- 
counting requires a required return (to convert 
earnings, a value flow, to a stock of value). Fair 
value accounting delivers the value directly 
from the balance sheet without relying on a re- 
quired return (as with the mark-to-market in- 
vestment fund). That is, the forecast of earnings 
in (B) is not necessary, for book value already 
reports the value. As a bonus, realisations on 
value at risk are reported in the income state- 
ment to give an indication of what the required 
return should be. 
In short, fair value accounting is a plus, imple- 
mentation issues aside. However, historical cost 
accounting has features that provide an alternative 
should ideal fair value accounting not be attain- 
able. Many of the statements about fair value ac- 
counting in the bullet points in the introduction to 
this paper are misdirected, at least at the conceptu- 
al level. 
As an illustration of this last statement - and to 
focus on the practical valuation task - the appen- 
dix carries out a valuation of the Coca-Cola 
Company using historical cost numbers. Coke has 
a lot of value missing from the balance sheet - its 
price-to-book ratio is currently 6.3 - mainly be- 
cause US GAAP does not allow its brand asset to 
be carried on the balance sheet. Those who com- 
plain that accounting is poor because intangible as- 
sets are missing from the balance sheet might 
argue that brands should be booked (as in the UK 
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before IFRS). After reading the Appendix, I hope 
you will be impressed by how readily Coke can be 
valued without getting the balance sheet straight. 
To point (1) above: missing (intangible) assets in 
the balance sheet are no problem (for valuation) if 
the earnings from those assets are reported in the 
income statement. Note that the Coke case is not 
one where valuation model (D) with ideal histori- 
cal cost accounting applies. That model implies 
a forward P/E of 10 (for a 10% required return, 
say), but Coke’s P/E is 19.3. Nor is it a case where 
the forecast (C) strictly applies. But the imperfec- 
tions of historical cost accounting can be accom- 
modated. 
A core accounting concept underlies the use of 
historical cost accounting in valuation: the can- 
celling error property. Provided that earnings are 
comprehensive (clean-surplus) earnings, it is al- 
ways true that 
Stock return, = Earnings, + (P, - B,) - (Pt-l - Bt-,) 
where P is equity price and B is the book value of 
equity.’ With fair value accounting, P = B at all 
points in time, so earnings always equal the stock 
return -just like earnings for the mark-to-market 
investment fund always equals the market return 
on the assets (cum-dividend). However, P = B is 
not necessary; provided that the error in the bal- 
ance sheet, P - B is the same at the end of the pe- 
riod as at the beginning, capitalising earnings still 
works. Historical cost reports a balance sheet with 
error, but the focus is on earnings. We teach the 
cancelling error property to our first-year account- 
ing students by pointing out that earnings is the 
same whether one expenses R&D immediately or 
capitalises it and amortises, provided there is no 
growth; that is, balance sheet errors cancel. 
Growth changes this (and therefore growth intro- 
duces a change in price premium over book value). 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
But growth can be accommodated in valuation, as 
the Coca-Cola example shows. 
I believe this equation first appears in P. Easton, T. Harris. 
and J. Ohlson, ‘Accounting earnings can explain most of secu- 
rity returns: the case of long event windows,’ Journal o j  
Accounting and Economics, 15 (June-September 1992): 
119-142, but textbooks of old used to discuss the cancelling 
error property. 
l o  Statement 157 defines the three levels as follows: 
Level linputs are quoted prices (unadjusted) observed in ac- 
tive markets for identical assets and liabilities. 
Level 2 inputs are inputs other than Level I quoted prices that 
are observable, directly or indirectly; examples include quot- 
ed prices for similar assets or liabilities in active markets, 
quoted prices for identical or similar assets or liabilities in 
markets that are not active, inputs such as observed interest 
rates, credit risks, volatilities, and default rates, and inputs cor- 
roborated by observable market data by correlation or other 
means. 
Level 3 inputs are unobservable inputs for the asset or liabili- 
ty, reflecting the firm’s own assumptions about the asaump- 
tions that market participants would use in pricing the assets 
or liability. 
3. Fair value measurements 
Concepts are the place to start, but the rubber hits 
the road with measurement. If ideal fair value ac- 
counting can be implemented, all is OK, for noth- 
ing is lost by abandoning historical cost 
accounting, and something is gained; we have a 
net plus. However, if fair value measurements do 
not achieve the ideal and at the same time we lose 
the information provided by historical cost ac- 
counting, damage can be done. 
After defining fair value as market exit price, 
the recent FASB Standard 157, Fair Value 
Measurements, then identifies three levels of ‘in- 
puts’ to determine market price, distinguished by 
increasing levels of subjectivity.‘O Levels 2 and 3 
refer to estimates of hypothetical market prices. 
The criticisms of subjective measurement are well 
known, and the FASB’s Level 3 ,  in particular, rais- 
es concerns. To sort out the pluses and minuses, it 
is worthwhile to focus on Level 1 measurement - 
where market prices for identical assets and liabil- 
ities are observed in active markets - for, if fair 
value accounting is not appropriate in that case, 
concerns are just magnified when subjective esti- 
mates are made. 
3.1. Pluses and minuses of Level 1 fair value 
measurements 
Implementation of fair value accounting (as pro- 
posed by the FASB and IASB) involves two ques- 
tions. The first is whether exit value measures 
value to shareholders. The second is whether fair 
values can be applied at the level of aggregate as- 
sets and liabilities that jointly produce value for 
shareholders - an issue of matching. 
Fair value as exit value 
One could envision the implementation of ideal 
fair value accounting with subjective estimates of 
fair values of assets and liabilities (for sharehold- 
ers), but that flies in the face of the idea that ac- 
counting information should be based on 
objective, reliable evidence. The FASB and IASB 
commendably maintain the ‘reliability’ criterion 
by requiring that fair value be backed up with an 
observed market price (at least in their Level 1 im- 
plementation). However, equating fair value to 
market value is quite constraining, for it equates 
value (to shareholders) to market (exit) price. 
Plus: Fair (market) values are a plus when value 
to the shareholders is determined solely by expo- 
sure to market price; that is, shareholder value is 
one-to-one with market prices. 
A marketable bond in which a firm invests its 
‘excess cash’ is exposed to changes in market price 
that determines the amount of cash on liquidation, 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 01
:26
 01
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
3 
Special Issue: International Accounting Policy Forum. 2007 
and shareholder welfare is tied to the market price, 
one-for-one. Accordingly, fair value is appropriate. 
It is similarly appropriate for shares held in a trad- 
ing portfolio where the investor gets the return, 
one-for-one, from the change in market price. 
Minus: Fair (market) values are a minus when 
the firm arbitrages market prices. That is, fair 
value is not appropriate when the firm adds value 
(for shareholders) by buying at (input) market 
prices and selling at (output) market prices. 
Raw material used in manufacturing does not get 
its value from a change in its exit market price, but 
as an input into a process that adds value to its 
market price by producing a product and selling it 
to customers; change in shareholder value is not 
one-to-one with the change in the market price of 
the input. With respect to stewardship, the manag- 
er should not be rewarded on the basis of changes 
in the market price of the raw material, but for 
adding value (earnings) from buying the input 
favourably and selling it, transformed, to cus- 
tomers with a mark-up. 
The one-to-one condition says that fair value is a 
minus where firms are involved in (expectational) 
arbitrage (of input and output) prices in their busi- 
ness model; that is, the business model adds value 
to market prices. Or stated differently, fair value is 
not appropriate when there is a top-line notion of a 
customer from whom value is received in an exit 
price, with value added over an input price. Fair 
value is appropriate when value comes from prop- 
erty rights and obligations, and value is added or 
lost (solely) from fluctuations in the market values 
of those rights and obligations.” 
Here are some cases where the one-to-one con- 
dition for fair value applies: 
1.  
2. 
3. 
4. 
5 .  
Investments in securities in a trading portfolio 
and derivative instruments on such securities. 
Pension assets: The firm has performed by con- 
tributing to the fund and has no influence on 
the performance of the fund, but shareholder 
welfare is affected directly by changes in the 
market value of the fund. 
Investments by an insurance company. In the 
business model these securities are value in re- 
serve and that value depends on market price. 
Real estate held for speculation with no plan 
for developing or utilising the real estate. 
Options that give the counter party (but not the 
” The perspective is similar to that under Coase’s transac- 
tions cost theory of the firm. Firms exist because markets are 
not perfect and thus prices do not measure value under all con- 
ditions. Firms and their hierarchies are more efficient than 
markets in some respect, entrepreneurs exploit those efficien- 
cies, and historical cost accounting reports the efficiency of 
firms is dealing with imperfect prices. 
39 
firm) the call rights; the firm is a passive count- 
er party. Warrants and call and put options on 
the firm’s own stock are an example. Freddie 
Mac and Fannie Mae mortgages are of this 
type. These are essentially traded put options 
on real estate - the right of property owners to 
sell property back to these institutions. 
Shareholders’ welfare is determined by the 
counter party’s call, not the firm’s. The market 
value of the instrument reflects the probability 
of this call and changes in the market value re- 
flect changes in shareholders’ welfare as this 
probability changes. 
Below are some cases where the one-to-one con- 
dition for fair value does not apply: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5.  
6. 
7. 
8.  
Inventory: the firm adds value by finding a cus- 
tomer. 
Investment in a subsidiary where the firm has 
influence. 
Assets and liabilities whose value changes as 
interest rates change but there is also a numer- 
ator effect (on future earnings) as well as a de- 
nominator effect from change in interest rates. 
These typically are instruments that involve 
customer relationships. Examples: commercial 
loans, mortgages held by originating banks, 
and core deposits. Historical cost accounting 
allows one to observe the numerator effects. 
Performance obligations. Fair value accounting 
books the liability to perform at the price that 
someone else would charge to satisfy the obli- 
gation, not at the cost at which the company 
can perform (possibly with comparative advan- 
tage). 
Receivable allowances and warranty liabilities. 
Value to shareholders is based on firm perform- 
ance in servicing these items (through its 
credit department and customer service depart- 
ment), not what the market would charge for 
non-recourse relief from the obligation. (Note: 
market values can be information for disciplin- 
ing estimates, but as an exercise in improved 
historical cost accounting, not as an application 
of fair value accounting.) 
Insurance assets and liabilities, other than in- 
vestment assets. 
Real estate held as input to business enterprise 
(for example, real estate development, real es- 
tate rentals). For real estate rentals, historical 
cost accounting recognises value through rental 
income in the income statement. 
Environmental clean-up liabilities. Fair value 
is the amount that someone would charge for 
the clean up, not the anticipated cost to the firm 
in managing the problem. 
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Fair values are particularly inappropriate when 
they replace historical cost accounting from which 
(fair) value is assessed: 
Minus: Fair market prices are a minus if they 
substitute for historical cost information and (effi- 
cient) prices depend on historical cost information. 
Carrying investments in a subsidiary at market 
prices (rather than under the equity method or pro- 
portionate consolidation) obscures the profitability 
of the subsidiary and the value of the parent which 
is based on that profitability. The value of an inter- 
mediary function - adding value from the spread 
between borrowing and lending rates - is obscured 
by fair valuing loans and borrowings if those exit 
values do not incorporate the firm-specific ‘intan- 
gibles’ in customer and depositor relationships. So 
with the insurance business that involves customer 
relationships in managing premiums and losses, 
along with operating costs.12 
The loss of historical cost information can lead 
to inefficient prices. The spectre of inefficient 
prices raises another issue: 
Minus: Fair values bring price bubbles into fi- 
nancial statements. 
Fair values (as exit prices) come with a caveat. 
Provided the one-to-one condition is satisfied, fair 
values are value to shareholder if market prices are 
‘efficient’. In a price bubble, however, inefficient 
prices are booked on the balance sheet, with bub- 
ble gains flowing through to the income statement. 
For trading portfolios where investments are held 
short-term, this may not be a large problem. But 
where the portfolio is held for the long-term, it is a 
problem. For instance, pension assets marked to 
bubble prices may give the appearance of satisfac- 
tory funding of future pension obligations and in- 
surance assets may give the appearance of 
adequate or even excess reserves against future in- 
surance losses. 
Fair value matching 
Fair value accounting is often promoted as a way 
to avoid the ‘myriad of rules’ involved in imple- 
menting revenue and expense matching in the in- 
come statement. Rut fair value accounting has its 
own matching concept that is difficult to implement. 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
’’ This is not to say that information about the sensitivity of 
earnings to changes in interest rates (for banks) or embedded 
values (for insurance companies) are not relevant footnote in- 
formation. 
l 3  The IASB included a fair value option in International 
Accounting Standard No. 39, Financial Instruments: 
Recognition and Measurement (London: IASB, December 
2003). An IASB amendment restricting the fair value option 
was published in June 2005 under the title, The Fair Value 
Option. The fair value option must be applied to a group of as- 
sets and/or liabilities that is both managed, and it performance 
evaluated, on a fair value basis. ’‘ FASB Proposed Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards, The Fair Value Option for  Financial Assets and 
Liabilities (Norwalk, Conn.: FASB, January 2006). 
Minus: Fair value accounting fails without asset 
and liability matching. 
Under a business model, assets and liabilities are 
used jointly to generate value for shareholders. If 
so, the stand-alone fair value of an asset has little 
meaning. To capture value added (from exposure 
to market prices), one matches fair values of all the 
assets and liabilities that generate the value togeth- 
er, leaving none out. A particular danger lies in fair 
valuing an asset and not matching the fair value of 
an associated liability whose price changes are 
negatively correlated with those of the asset. 
In the income statement, such fair value mis- 
matching results in recognition of gains and not 
offsetting losses (or vice versa). The case of nega- 
tive correlation produces ‘excess volatility’ in 
earnings about which one can indeed complain. 
Note further that, even if fair values of individual 
assets and liabilities are matched and summed, the 
total may not capture the value of the group if they 
are used synergistically. (In this case it is difficult 
to see that the one-to-one condition would hold 
anyway, so the point may be mute.). 
1. Core deposits. These are intangible assets for 
banks which represent the ability to obtain rel- 
atively inexpensive funds from demand, sav- 
ings and small denomination time deposits. 
Their value is difficult to estimate but it is neg- 
atively related to the value of the loan portfo- 
lio: When interest rates rise, the value of the 
loan portfolio typically declines but the value 
of the core deposits intangible asset typically 
increases. If the loan portfolio is marked-to- 
market but the value of the core deposits intan- 
gible is not recognised, earnings and book 
value will be artificially depressed. But the one- 
to-one condition says that customer deposits 
should not be fair valued. So, if loan portfolios 
are fair valued, a mismatching occurs. 
2. Borrowings. The decline in the value of a 
firm’s assets (due to deteriorating profitability) 
is accompanied by an offsetting decline in the 
value of its debt obligations (due to deteriorat- 
ing credit quality). If the decrease in the value 
of liabilities is recognised as a gain in the in- 
come statement, but the decrease in asset value 
is not recognised (for example, due to difficul- 
ties in measuring the value of some intangible 
assets such as customer relationships), earnings 
will be overstated at times when high quality 
information is especially important. 
The matching issue is particularly difficult when 
an instrument whose value varies with price is 
used in conjunction with assets and liabilities 
whose value is tied to customer relationships. A 
fair value option under IASB  standard^'^ (and pro- 
posed in a current FASB exposure draft14), at- 
Cases where mismatching can occur: 
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tempts to address the matching problem, but not so 
if the asset or liability fair valued under the option 
does not satisfy the one-to-one condition. 
3.2. Pluses and minuses of Level 2 and Level 3 
fair value measurements 
Levels 2 and 3 admit estimates of hypothetical 
market prices. Level 3 ,  while insisting that the fair 
value is based on an estimate of market price 
(rather than value-in-use), permits ‘unobservable 
inputs’ that ‘reflect the reporting entity’s own as- 
sumptions about assumptions that market partici- 
pants would use in pricing the asset or liability.’ 
The objections to using subjective estimates are 
well understood. However, any accounting beyond 
mere cash accounting involves estimates. The 
question of where to draw the line on estimates 
(Level 2 but not Level 3?) is difficult to handle a 
priori, for resolution rides largely on one’s assess- 
ment, not only of the integrity of managers but 
also of their (honest) subjective biases. The com- 
petence and independence of monitors - auditors, 
assessors, and corporate boards - must also be 
evaluated, along with the effectiveness of controls. 
(Honest) managers are naturally optimistic, for it 
is their business plan. Accounting, however, serves 
as a counterweight to managements’ optimism, so 
raising their estimates to the level of accounting 
information contaminates. Some argue that such 
estimates elicit information from management that 
might not otherwise surface. The stewardship per- 
spective underscores the downside; rewarding 
managers based on their estimates exposes the 
shareholder to moral hazard. 
Here are a few points to consider when enter- 
taining the use of estimated fair values. 
First, the restriction in Section 3.1 that fair value 
accounting applies only when shareholder value is 
solely determined by exposure to market prices 
means that, in most cases, there will be an active 
market where Level 1 measurements are available. 
If a firm has to execute by finding a customer in an 
illiquid market, value is usually determined by that 
ability to execute, not solely by market prices. So 
situations where estimation is required may be 
limited (if the one-to-one condition is honoured). 
Second, one must question whether Level 3 real- 
ly enforces a discipline in estimating market 
prices. Using one’s own assumptions could yield 
estimates resulting in upfront (day one) estimated 
profits. 
Third, fair value estimation errors introduce 
error into the balance sheet but also the income 
statement (which reports the change in fair value). 
Indeed, with random errors in both the opening 
41 
and closing balance sheet - bias aside - the errors 
are compounded in the income statement.15 If one 
has a fuzzy balance sheet, fair value is less inform- 
ative, but if one also loses the informative histori- 
cal cost earnings, mark up a definite minus. In the 
extreme, estimated fair values could produce an 
uninformative balance sheet and a less uninforma- 
tive income statement. 
Fourth, it is sometimes said that historical cost 
involves estimates and estimated fair values are no 
different. But estimates to effect matching under 
historical cost are based on, and audited against, 
the historical transaction record - like the histori- 
cal experience with credit losses, useful lives and 
warranty service costs. Level 2, with ‘observable 
inputs’, could be interpreted as invoking this no- 
tion. But the notion is quite different from specu- 
lating about the present value of the cash flows 
when marking to model. 
Fifth, historical cost estimates true up against the 
actual transaction record, and usually fairly quick- 
ly. Fair value estimates usually do so but, without 
an associated ‘historical transaction accounting’, 
estimated fair values settle up against estimated 
fair values. So, the fair value of a long-term con- 
tract on the output of an energy plant might be re- 
estimated each year but, without a reporting on the 
actual sales and expenses of running the plant each 
year, the subsequent estimated fair values become 
elusive. The same can be said about insurance con- 
tracts: the fair value of an insurance contract is in- 
formed by the historical experience reported in 
premiums matched to losses and expenses. Note 
that the FASB’s fair value accounting for employ- 
ee stock options (at grant date) does not settle up 
at all (so, if the option is not exercised, the record- 
ed expense is not reversed). 
Sixth, I suspect that an analyst will have difficul- 
ty in carrying out a quality analysis on fair value 
accounting. How would estimation errors, biased 
or random, be discovered? Disclosures about the 
valuation methodology are required under FASB 
Statement 157 and these presumably will help. But 
I am not clear on how earnings quality diagnostics 
of the type applied under historical cost accounting 
(again, with reference with what is normal in the 
transaction history) would be developed. 
Seventh, observed market behaviour is instruc- 
tive. Hedge funds (largely unregulated) apply fair 
value accounting and estimate fair values for illiq- 
uid assets. They do so under the rigour of formal 
valuation committees with oversight of their 
boards and auditors. But there is a danger in share- 
holders trading in and out of the fund at values 
based on estimates. So funds typically limit the 
percentage of illiquid assets held or require lock- 
ups or transfers to side pockets until realisation. 
Private equity funds typically require realisation 
before distribution. In short, the tolerance for esti- 
l5  This effect is demonstrated formally in K .  Peasnell, 
‘Institution-specific Value’, BIS Working paper No. 210, 
August 2006. 
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mated fair value (by shareholders) is limited. 
Eighth, the research reported by Wayne 
Landsman at this conference indicates that the in- 
formativeness of fair values declines as estimates 
are introduced. 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
because I sense that those properties are not al- 
ways appreciated in the discussion of fair values. 
A balance sheet focus is not necessary for valua- 
tion, for we also have an income statement. 
Historical cost income statements report earnings 
from assets and valuation can be made from earn- 
ings even though their fair value is not on the bal- 
ance sheet. The Coca-Cola valuation in the 
appendix makes the point. I don’t see a plus from 
booking an estimate of the market price of Coke’s 
brand asset to the balance sheet and then running 
the revaluations through the income statement. 
This scenario is not on the horizon, one would 
think, but there is little difference in principle in 
applying exit values to banks’ loans and deposits 
that also get their value from brands and other cus- 
tomer intangibles. 
This having been said, the implementation of 
historical cost accounting is not without its prob- 
lems, and many criticisms of historical cost ac- 
counting under current GAAP are well taken. The 
analyst is frustrated by a number of features of 
GAAP. I really have not engaged in tallying up the 
pluses and minuses of fair values against the plus- 
es and minuses of historical cost accounting with 
all its measurement issues. But, it is difficult to see 
how fair value accounting (with exit prices) solves 
the problems with historical cost accounting when 
the one-to-one condition is not satisfied. That con- 
dition is a necessary condition for fair value ac- 
counting. Further, while the implementation 
problems with historical cost accounting are due to 
difficulties of revenue and expense matching, fair 
value accounting also has its own (asset and liabil- 
ity) matching problems and these appear to be se- 
rious ones. 
4. Conclusion: pluses and minuses 
In this paper I have taken a demand approach in 
considering the pluses and minuses of fair value 
accounting: Do fair values enhance the task of eq- 
uity valuation and stewardship assessment? Surely 
I have not exhausted this exploration, but some 
points have been made. At a conceptual level, fair 
value accounting is a plus; equity value is read 
from the balance sheet, with no further analysis 
needed, and the income statement reports realisa- 
tions for determining value at risk. But concepts 
are one thing and implementation another. With fair 
value defined as exit price, the minuses add up (!). 
Fair value accounting works well, for both valu- 
ation and stewardship, with investment funds 
(where shareholders trade in and out of the fund at 
net asset value). This case is instructive for it is the 
situation where the one-to-one relationship be- 
tween exit prices and fair value to shareholders 
holds. That one-to-one condition fails, however, 
when a firm holds net assets whose value comes 
from execution of a business plan rather than fluc- 
tuations in market prices, even when exit prices 
are observed in active markets. Asset and liability 
matching problems confound the problem further. 
Overlay the minuses of estimated fair values when 
actual prices are not observed, and the minuses do 
add up. 
I have spent some time laying out the valuation 
properties of historical cost accounting - better re- 
ferred to as ‘historical transaction accounting’ - 
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Appendix. A valuation of the Coca-Cola Company based on historical cost information 
At the close of trading on 8 December 2006, the Coca-Cola Company’s shares traded at $48.91 each. The price- 
to-book ratio was 6.3, indicating a lot of value missing from the balance sheet, largely because US GAAP does 
not allow Coke’s intangible (brand) assets to be booked to the balance sheet. The forward P/E was 19.3, based 
on analysts’ consensus EPS forecast for 2007. 
The following valuation yields a value of $49.09 per share using only information available in the historical 
cost financial statements. The valuation is crude (and can be refined), but the point is that we get close to the 
market price by using historical cost information and, indeed, with three line items. 
The historical cost numbers 
Here are the relevant line items for years 2002-2005 ($m): 
2005 2004 2003 2002 
Sales (1) 2 1,962 2 1,044 19,656 17,545 
Operating income, after tax (2) 5,065 4,427 4,192 3 $4 1 
Net operating assets (average) (3) 16,985 16,006 15,220 14,526 
The financial statement analysis 
From these line items, the following valuation inputs can be calculated: 
2005 2004 2003 2002 
Operating profit margin (2 + 1) 23.1% 21.0% 21.3% 21.9% 
Asset turnover (1  + 3) 1.29 1.31 1.29 1.21 
Average operating profit margin 21.8% 
Average asset turnover 1.28 
Average sales growth rate, on a base 
of 200 1 sales of $17,354m) 
The valuation model 
We employ a standard residual income valuation model that calculates missing value in the balance sheet from 
a forecast of forward (2006) operating income: 
Vulue of Equity,,,, = Book Value of Equity,,,,,, + Residual Income from Operutions2,,, 
6.6% 
Required Return - Growth Rate 
where 
Residual Income from Operations,,,, = Forecasted Operating Incomezo,, - (Required 
Only the residual income from operations is forecasted because residual earnings from interest on net debt are 
usually close to zero. 
The forecast 
As the book value of equity and net operating assets for 2005 are in the 2005 financial statements, we need 
only a forecast of operating income for 2006, the required return, and the growth rate for residual income. 
For the required return, we will use 10% which is approximately the current Treasury rate of 4.6% plus a risk 
premium of 5.4%. 
If both the profit margin and the asset turnover are constant, then residual operating income grows at the sales 
growth rate.16 The condition is approximately satisfied for Coke, so we set the growth rate at the sales growth 
rate of 6.6%. 
Return x Net Operating Assetszoos) 
The historical financial statements supply a forecast of operating income and residual operating income: 
Forecasted sales for 2006 = Sales for 2005 x ( I  + Average sales growth rate) 
= $2 1,962 x 1.066 
= $23,411 
Forecasted operating income for 2006 = Sales for 2006 x Average profit margin 
= $23,411 x 0.218 
= $5,104 
Forecasted residual operating income for 2006 = $5,104 - (0.10 x 17,113) 
= $3,392 
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~~~ ~ ~~ 
Appendix. A valuation of the Coca-Cola Company based on historical cost information (continued) 
The valuation 
With a 2005 book value of equity of $15,935, the calculated value with these inputs is 
Value of Equity,,, = $15,935 + 3,392 
0.10 - 0.066 
= $115,70Om, or $49.09 per share 
The valuation is crude, by design, to make a point. It uses only information in the historical financial statements 
(plus as assumed required return). Yet is comes quite close to the market price of $48.91. Adding more infor- 
mation (about sales growth rates) and a different required return will change the valuation, but the historical 
cost financial statements yield considerable insights. Most importantly, it challenges the notion that one needs 
to have fair values on the balance sheet to value equity claims. Indeed, it is hard to see how fair value estimates 
of assets and liabilities would enhance the valuation. 
In choosing Coca-Cola, I am of course being selective; not all firms are as easy to value as Coke. The histor- 
ical cost information for a bio-tech start-up with no product yet out of R&D is not much use for valuation, for 
example. The financial reports would report losses and, possibly, negative book values. However, again, it is dif- 
ficult to see how exit prices would redeem the accounting. Better for the analyst to get a biochemistry degree. 
l6  See S. Penman, Financial Statement Analysis and Security Valuation. 3rd ed. (New York: The McGraw-Hill Companies, 
2007), p. 523. 
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